#### Blockchains with Proof-of-Stake



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Blockchain with Proof-of-Stake

#### Outline

- 1. PoS-based Blockchains
  - overview to Bitcoin
  - Ouroboros Praos
  - Algorand
- 2. Two Crypto Notions
  - security parameter and asymptotic behavior
  - pairing
- 3. Experience in Industry

# What is a blockchain?

What kind of functionality it wants to achieve?

What kind of data structure it uses?

What kind of method (algorithm) it uses to achieve the functionality?



In this view, a blockchain is a distributed ledger linked by hash value.

# Let's recall how Bitcoin works



In Bitcoin, the block hash is restricted below a threshold.

The first miner create a block with small block hash can issue a block.

↑ try many possibilities of nonces



# Let's recall how Bitcoin works

#### When does a block become "confirmed?"



Time

#### In practice, a block with six successors is recognized as confirmed.

In short, Nakamoto consensus has two main components.



limited resources that resist dummy accounts

the way that each miner reach a consensus

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### **Energy Consumption of Bitcoin**



#### Energy Consumption by Country Chart

at July 27. 2019

 $\equiv$ 

# Proof-of-Stake

- Stake is the currency that a participant lock up in the protocol as a guarantee.
- The right to issue a block is related to the stakes that participants own.



#### **Ouroboros Praos**

Proposed by Bernardo David, Peter Gazi, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell in 2017.

Accepted by EuroCrypt 2018.

Compare to Bitcoin, Ouroboros Praos consists of





Can we verify the authentication of the generation of the random number?

# Verifiable Random Function (VRF)

VRF is a function that generates a random number, where the computation can be verified.

In construction, a VRF is a 3-tuple of algorithms (*Gen*, *Eval*, *Veri*) such that

- $Gen(1^{\lambda}) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$
- $Eval(sk, x) \rightarrow (y, proof)$
- $Veri(pk, x, y, proof) \rightarrow \{yes, no\}$

$$\boxed{Eval(sk,x)} \xrightarrow{(y,proof)} \boxed{Veri(pk,x,y,proof)} \longrightarrow yes/no$$

# Verifiable Random Function (VRF)

$$\underbrace{Eval(sk, x)} \xrightarrow{(y, proof)} \underbrace{Veri(pk, x, y, proof)} \longrightarrow yes/no$$

A secure VRF must satisfy

• Complete Provability

Suppose (y, proof) = Eval(sk, x). Then Pr(Veri(pk, x, y, proof) = yes) = 1.

• Unique Provability

No  $(pk, x, proof_1, proof_2, y_1, y_2)$  such that  $y_1 \neq y_2$  can satisfy  $Veri(pk, x, y_1, proof_1) = Veri(pk, x, y_2, proof_2) = yes$ .

• Pseudorandomness

The generated y should be indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed string.

# Verifiable Random Function (VRF)

$$\underbrace{Eval(sk, x)} \underbrace{(y, proof)} \underbrace{Veri(pk, x, y, proof)} \longrightarrow yes/no$$

Remind that the signature has the properties:

- 1. only the user with the secret key can generate a valid signature
- 2. everyone with the public key can verify the signature
- 3. without the secret key, the signature should be unpredictable In practice, a VRF can be constructed by a unique signature and a random oracle.

That is

$$Eval(sk, x) = Hash(Sig_{sk}(x)).$$

In Ouroboros Praos, protocol is executed in "slots." We define

- *data* to be slot id and some block information (public)
- $\alpha_i$  to be the relative stake of participant  $p_i$

For each slot, participant  $p_i$  is allowed to propose a block if  $Eval(sk_i, data) < T(\alpha_i).$ 

Other participants can easily verify the qualification by  $Veri(pk_i, data, y, proof)$ .

For each slot, there may be zero, one, or many proposed blocks. In this case, the honests follow the longest chain.



David et al. showed that it is secure if the honests own  $>\frac{1}{2}$  stakes.

Proposed by Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, Nickolai Zeldovich in 2017.

Accepted by SOSP 2017.

Compare to Bitcoin, Algorand consists of



#### **Byzantine Agreement**



Suppose there are three generals.

They want to have a consensus that whether they should attack or not.

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#### Algorand

Like Ouroboros Praos, the qualification of proposing blocks are decided by VRF.

For each block height, participant  $p_i$  is allowed to propose a block if  $v_i = Eval(sk_i, data, coin id) < T$ .

So that the more stake  $p_i$ , the more chances  $p_i$  can try

Ideally, the winner of the block is the one with smallest VRF value v.

However, how to make sure every participant have a consensus?

=> Byzantine agreement

# Algorand





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#### Definition (Primes problem)

Given an integer N, decide whether N is a prime or not.

In 2002, Manindra Agrawal, Neeraj Kayal and Nitin Saxena finally showed that Primes problem is in **P**.

If we can try the division up to  $\sqrt{N}$ , why Primes problem  $\in \mathbf{P}$  doesn't hold trivially?

Key: the running time is counted in input size.



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# What is the time complexity of breaking AES-256?

Let's define problem of breaking-encryption as follow.

Given an encryption oracle  $E_{sk}(\cdot)$ , try to find the underling secret key sk.

Now, suppose our target is AES-256.

Then, what is the time complexity of breaking AES-256?

How many permutations are there that maps n-bit-long strings to n-bit-long strings?

Let  $S_n$  denote the set of all the permutation mapping  $\{0,1\}^n$  to  $\{0,1\}^n$ .

Let  $K_n$  denote the random variable that uniformly distributes over  $S_n$ .

#### Definition (uniform permutation ensemble)

The uniform permutation ensemble, denoted  $\mathcal{K} = \{K_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ , has  $K_n$  uniformly distributed over the set of all permutations mapping *n*-bit-long strings to *n*-bit-long strings.

#### Definition (permutation ensemble)

A permutation ensemble is a sequence  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  of random variables such that the random variable  $P_n$  assumes values in the set of permutations mapping *n*-bit-long strings to *n*-bit-long strings.

#### Definition (Pseudorandom permutation ensemble)

A permutation ensemble  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  is called *pseudorandom* if for every probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine M, every polynomial  $p(\cdot)$ , and all sufficiently large n's,

$$\left|\Pr\left(M^{P_n}(1^n)\right) - \Pr\left(M^{K_n}(1^n)\right)\right| < \frac{1}{p(n)},$$

where  $\mathcal{K} = \{K_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  is the uniform permutation ensemble.

# **Computational Indistinguishability**

When we talk about the asymptotic behavior of an algorithm, we need that algorithm accepts any length of the input.

Many cryptographic definitions rely on the computational indistinguishability.

The formal definition of computational indistinguishability refers to probability ensembles, which are infinite sequences of probability distributions.

# Pairing

#### **Definition (Pairing)**

A pairing is a map

$$e: G_1 \times G_2 \to G_3$$

satisfies the following two conditions:

• Bilinearity

 $e(P + P', Q) = e(P, Q)e(P', Q), \forall P, P' \in G_1, Q \in G_2$  $e(P, Q + Q') = e(P, Q)e(P, Q'), \forall P \in G_1, Q, Q' \in G_2$ 

• Non-degeneracy

For all non-zero  $P \in G_1$ ,  $\exists Q \in G_2$  such that  $e(P,Q) \neq 1$ For all non-zero  $Q \in G_2$ ,  $\exists P \in G_1$  such that  $e(P,Q) \neq 1$ 

# Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem

#### Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem

Let G be a cyclic group. Given the generator P and (aP, bP, Q), try to decide whether Q = abP.

Pairings make the DDH problem easy.

Because

$$e(aP, bP) = e(P, P)^{ab} = e(P, abP).$$

It is easily to decide DDH by checking e(aP, bP) ?= e(P, Q).

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